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DEMOCRACY AND DRED SCOTT.

SPEECH DELIVERED BY

SMITH D. ATKINS,

Before the Freeport Wide Awakes, at Plymouth Hall, Monday Evening, Aug. 14, 1860.

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Mr. Atkins, being introduced to the audience by Capt. MILLS, said:

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MY FELLOW CITIZENS:

In the political discussions of 1852, the Slavery issue had no part. The Whig party, and the Democratic party, at Baltimore, had both resolved, that they would not discuss the question in Congress or out of Congress. In that canvass Franklin Pierce was elected, triumphantly, and sustained by an overwhelming Democratic majority in both branches of Congress. Before his administration was half through, it became necessary, in the ordinary course of legislation, for territorial governments to be organized for the territories of Kansas and Nebraska. Stephen A. Douglas, of the United States Senate, as chairman of the committee on territories, reported from his committee, a bill for their organization.—That bill was similar in its provisions to all of the previous bills under our government, for the organization of Territories—*it contained no clause repealing the Missouri Compromise.* Senator Dixon of Kentucky, in conjunction with Senator Atchison of Missouri, made a proposition to Mr. Douglas to introduce into those territorial charters a clause repealing the Missouri Compromise. Mr. Douglas took the matter under advisement, and in just nineteen days and a half, I think, introduced other bills, each containing a repealing clause, in these words:

That the Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the Territory of Kansas (and Nebraska) as elsewhere within the United States, *except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March sixth, eighteen hundred and twenty,* which, being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories, as recognized by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures, is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, *subject only to the Constitution of the United States.*

The voice of this nation had not asked for that repeal. No petitions had been sent up to Congress praying that it might be done. Indeed Judge Douglas himself, had previously said that "the Missouri Compromise had an origin akin to that of the Constitution of the United States, conceived in the spirit of fraternal affection," and that it "had been canonized in the hearts of the American people as a sacred thing, which no ruthless hand would ever be reckless enough to disturb." Is it any wonder that the nation was surprised and shocked—that the fires of agitation were again kindled all over this Republic—that during the memorable struggle on the passage of that bill, petitions were sent up to Congress, signed by thousands upon thousands, praying, *not* that the Missouri Compromise might be repealed, but that the "ruthless hand" of Judge Douglas be stayed, and like the eight hundred New England clergymen, protesting, solemnly protesting against it? The bill was passed, on the night of July 21st, 1854. A party triumph had been gained. The bells of the city of Washington were rung, and bonfires were built in the streets of our national capital, to celebrate it—*to celebrate the triumph of slavery over freedom.*

In the meantime there arose a law case in Missouri; an action of trespass *vi et armis*, by Dred Scott, a negro, against one Sandford, who claimed to be his master, to try the question of Dred Scott's freedom, and the freedom of his wife and children, which case found its way into the supreme court of the United States. The facts in the case were that Dred Scott was brought by his master, voluntarily on the part of his master, in 1834, to Rock Island, here into the free State of Illinois, upon our own soil, and for two years held in Rock Island as a slave—forty seven years after the adoption of the North West ordinance, that threw its protecting shield of freedom over all the territory from which the State of Illinois was formed, and sixteen years after

the free State constitution of our State was adopted. Dred Scott was then taken to the military post at Ft. Snelling, in Minnesota, and there held as a slave two years longer. During the time he was at Ft. Snelling, Dred Scott was married and had two children born. The case was argued in the supreme court of the United States, at December term, 1855, but for some reason the supreme court held back its decision; it may have been, as I think, because the judges of that court were afraid, if then rendered, it would imperil the success of the Democratic party in the then coming presidential struggle. Then came the campaign of 1856, carried, nominally, on "popular sovereignty," and the Democratic party were again successful, if the election of James Buchanan can be considered a success.

The President in his message lauded the supreme court, and called upon the people to sustain its decisions. This some people regarded as very singular, especially as their new president was elected upon the Cincinnati platform, which construes the Constitution of the United States in regard to Internal improvements, differently from what the supreme court had construed it, and by the seventh plank of that platform, "That Congress has no power to charter a National Bank," notwithstanding the supreme court had decided expressly to the contrary. Up to that time the Democratic party was the only party in the country that was opposed to decisions of the supreme court. Was it expected that the supreme court was about to decide a case in such a manner that the people's inherent sense of justice would be shocked by it—so far departing from the policy of the fathers, and the land marks of history, that the people would intuitively revolt at its monstrous doctrine? Let us judge, by the Dred Scott decision, which now came, and to which I beg to call your attention. I read from the regular report of that decision by the supreme court Reporter—from the syllabus of that case:

> 3. Every citizen has a right to take with him into the Territory any article of property which the Constitution of the United States recognizes as property.
>
> 4. The Constitution of the United States recognizes slaves as property, and pledges the Federal Government to protect it. And Congress cannot exercise any more authority over property of that description than it may constitutionally exercise over property of any other kind.
>
> 5. The act of Congress, therefore, prohibiting a citizen of the United States from taking with him slaves when he removed to the territory in question to reside, is an exercise of authority over private property which is not warranted by the Constitution—and the removal of the plaintiff, by his owner, to that territory, gave him no title to freedom.

And I read from the opinion of the court, delivered by Judge Taney, page 404, in speaking of the Negro race, the court says:

> On the contrary they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, *whether emancipated or not*, yet remained subject to their authority, *and had no rights or privileges* except such as those who held the power and government might choose to grant them.

And again the court says, in speaking of the negroes at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, on page 407:

> They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations, and so far inferior, *that they had* NO *rights which the white man was bound to respect;* and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it.

And on page 410, after quoting from the Declaration of Independence, the court by Judge Taney, says:

> The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood.

And then Judge Taney proceeds to *overrule* that Declaration, and that, too, by a system of petty special pleading and pettitoging, which, if adopted by a Freeport lawyer in Judge Seem's court, would insure for him a fine for contempt. [Laughter] And Judge Taney proceeds with the opinion of the Court, as follows, on pages 451–2:

> And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in the slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen. NO *tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial*, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of the Government.
>
> Now, *we have already said* in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, that the right of property in a slave *is* distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.
>
> Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore *void;* and that neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this territory, even if they had been carried there by the owner with the intention of becoming a *permanent resident.*

And Judge Campbell, who agreed with the court, but thought the case of sufficient importance to warrant his filing a separate opinion, on page 576 says:

> "Wherever a master is entitled to go within the United States, *his slave* may accompany him, without any impediment from, or fear of, Congressional Legislation or interference."

We all know that a master may go anywhere within the United States that he pleases, into any free State, and stay as long as he may choose—he may come here into the free State of Illinois, if he will; and become a "permanent resident," if he like; but we never supposed—the fathers of our Republic never dreamed—that he could bring with him his slave property in defiance of all law.

Let us see what Democrats think of this decision. President James Buchanan, elected alone by Democratic votes, in his annual message to Congress, on December 19, 1859, says:

I cordially congratulate you upon the final settlement by the Supreme Court of the United States of the question of slavery in the territories, which had presented an aspect so truly formidable at the commencement of my administration. The right has been established of every citizen to take his property of any kind *including slaves*, into the common Territories belonging equally to all the States of the Confederacy, and to have it protected there under the federal constitution. Neither Congress, NOR A TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE, NOR ANY HUMAN POWER, has any authority to annul or impair this vested right. The supreme judicial tribunal of the country, which is a co-ordinate branch of the government, has sanctioned and affirmed these principles of constitutional law.

If this is not a total denial of popular sovereignty, I am altogether mistaken.—But lest there be some here who would not be willing to take the authority of James Buchanan on that question, let us see what Stephen A. Douglas, who *claims* (?) to be the father of popular sovereignty, has himself said. At New Orleans, when speaking to a crowd of southerners and slaveholders, Mr. Douglas said:

I, in common with the Democracy of Illinois, accept the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Dred Scott case, as an authoritative exposition of the Constitution. Whatever limitations the Constitution, as expounded by the Courts, imposes on the authority of a Territorial Legislature, we cheerfully recognize and respect, in conformity with that decision. *Slaves are recognised as property, and placed on equal footing with all other property. Hence the owner of slaves—the same as the owner of any other species of property—has a right to remove to a Territory and carry his slaves with him.*"

I wonder what the followers of Stephen A. Douglas, who are claiming to be popular sovereignty men, think of that declaration of his? Was he authorized to speak for the Illinois Democracy? But, he made another speech, at the invitation of the United States circuit court grand jury, at Springfield, in this State, on June 12, 1857, in which he endorses the Dred Scott decision, as follows:

The court did not attempt to avoid responsibility by disposing of the case upon technical points without touching the merits, nor did they go out of their way to decide questions not properly before them and directly presented by the record. *Like honest and conscientious judges, as they are,* they met and decided each point as it arose, and faithfully performed their whole duty and nothing but their duty to the country *by determining all the questions in the case,* and nothing but what was essential to the decision of the case upon its merits.

And Mr. Johnson, now running on the same ticket with Mr. Douglas as a candidate for Vice President, speaking in regard to the exclusion of slavery from the territories, held forth as follows:

For the purpose of this question, it matters not where the power of legislating for the territory resides—whether exclusively in Congress, or jointly in Congress and the inhabitants, or exclusively in the inhabitants of the territory; the power is precisely the same—no greater in the hands of one than the other. *In no event, can the slaveholder of the South be excluded from settling in such territory* WITH HIS PROPERTY OF EVERY DESCRIPTION.

However, lest the individual statement of these men should not be taken as authoritative expositions of Democracy, let us see what they say in their party platforms. On the fourth day of January last, on the occasion of election of delegates to the National Democratic Convention at Charleston, the Douglas democracy of Illinois, in State convention, at Springfield, adopted these two resolutions:

3. That all questions affecting the validity or constitutionality of any territorial enactments, shall be referred for final decision to the Supreme Court of the United States as the only tribunal by the Constitution which is competent to determine them.

Resolved, That we recognize the paramount judicial authority of the supreme court of the United States, as provided in the Constitution, and hold it to be the imperative duty of all good citizens to respect and obey the decisions of that tribunal, and to aid by all lawful means, in carrying them into faithful execution.

And the Breckinridge wing of the Democratic party, adopted the following resolutions, at Baltimore, on June 23d, 1860, on which Breckinridge and Lane now stand:

1. That the government of the Territory organized by an act of Congress *is provisional and temporary*, and during its existence all citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with their property in the Territory, without their rights, either of person or property, being *destroyed or injured* by Congressional or *Territorial* legislation.

2. That it is the duty of the Federal Government, in all its departments, to protect the rights of persons and property in the Territories, and wherever else its constitutional authority extends.

And the Douglas Democracy, at Baltimore, on the same day, adopted the following, commonly known as the "Wickliffe resolution:"

Resolved, That it is in accordance with the Cincinnati Platform, that during the existence of Territorial Governments, the measure of restriction, whatever it may be, imposed by the Federal Constitution on the power of the Territorial Legislature over the subject of the domestic relations, *as the same has been or shall hereafter be decided by the supreme court of the United States*, should be respected by all good citizens, and enforced with promptness and fidelity *by every branch of the General Government.*

There is *no* claim made that the Breckinridge democracy are at all in favor of popular sovereignty, and in view of this Wickliffe resolution there *can be less* claim made that the Douglas Democracy are.—The only difference between the two wings is, that the Breckinridge democracy are satisfied with the supreme court decision, *as now made*, while the Douglas wing is pledged to *anything* the supreme court may *hereafter decide*, no matter what. However, as there may be, just possibly, some popular sovereignty man that thinks Douglas does not stand upon this Wickliffe resolution, let me read what Douglas says in his letter of acceptance:

Upon a careful examination of the platform of principles adopted at Charleston and reaffirmed at Baltimore, with an additional resolution which is in perfect harmony with the others, I find it to be a faithful embodiment of the time honored principles of the Democratic party.

The identical Wickliffe resolution being the *only* "additional resolution which was adopted at Baltimore," and the one to which Mr. Douglas refers. And again, near the close of his letter:

Every right guaranteed by the Constitution must be protected by law in all cases where legislation is necessary to its engagements. The judicial authority, as provided by the Constitution, must be sustained and *its decisions implicitly obeyed and faithfully executed*.

Remembering what the Dred Scott case decides, even as Douglas himself renders that decision in his speech at New Orleans, what man in his sober senses can pretend to believe that there is a single shred of popular sovereignty left in the Democratic party.

Let us now resume the Dred Scott case, and see to what the Democratic party, and both wings of it, by the declarations of their leaders, and their platforms, are pledged. The Dred Scott Case decides:

1st, That "Negroes have NO rights which white men are bound to respect," and consequently that no person that has the first particle of African blood in his veins, can be a citizen of the United States, *even to the extent of being able to sue in its courts for his liberty, or the liberty of his child that has been kidnapped.*

2d, That the right of property in human beings is distinctly affirmed in the Constitution.

3d That consequently Slavery cannot be prohibited in the territories *by any authority whatever*, nor any where else where the Constitution is the paramount law.

4th That Dred Scott was lawfully held as a slave *both at Rock Island in Illinois, and at Ft. Snelling;* and that it would have made no difference had he been taken there with the intention of a *permanent residence.*

That is Democracy. That is Breckinridge Democracy, and it is Douglas Democracy. Slavery National; Liberty Sectional. Slavery the rule; Liberty the exception. Slavery first; Liberty afterwards. "To this complexion has it come at last."

Let us see what the Republican party say. I read the seventh plank in their platform, adopted unanimously by the Republican party, in National Convention, at Chicago, May 17th 1860:

7. That the *new dogma* that the Constitution, *of its own force*, carries Slavery into any or all of the Territories of the United States, is a dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit provisions of that instrument itself, with cotemporaneous exposition, and with legislative and judicial precedent; is revolutionary in its tendency, and subversive of the peace and harmony of the country

Now I hope I have clearly presented one of the political issues of the campaign—the main one. Need I do more? Is not a plain statement of the case sufficient to lead every lover of Free Labor to choose the Republican creed? Should I stop here, have I not already produced in my speech a convincing argument? (Applause)

But I will not stop here. I am going to call your attention for a little while to what the Fathers of this Republic have done and said about this matter. Stephen A. Douglas, in his speech at Columbus, Ohio, said "our fathers when they framed the Government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better than we do now." I think so too. And Patrick Henry has left the declaration upon record that he had "no lamp by which his feet were guided, except the lamp of the past." I have not. Have you? Has the world? Let us then turn our eyes to the past and see how far the modern Democracy have departed from the policy of the fathers—how much has been uprooted, overturned and overruled by the Dred Scott decision. And for the sake of a little method I will trace the *legislation* that is overruled and abrogated by the Dred Scott case; and second, the *decisions of the Supreme Courts of various States*, where precisely similar facts to the Dred Scott case have been passed upon; and third the decisions overruled by this Dred Scott case *heretofore made by the Supreme Court of the United States*, when MARSHALL and STORY were on the bench.

First then the Legislation; and first of all

the Declaration of Independence, that grandest act of legislation in all the history of the world—upon which our subsequent Constitutions and Statutes rest—I read:

We hold these truths to be self evident—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute new a government, laying its foundation upon such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

And who were some of the Fathers that so declared? Among them I find John Hancock, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Elbridge Gerry, Stephen Hopkins, William Ellery, Roger Sherman, John Witherspoon, Benjamin Rush, Benjamin Franklin, Charles Carroll, George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, Thomas Jefferson, Francis Lightfoot Lee and Edward Rutledge—great and immortal names, and great and immortal too were the truths they told in that old Declaration of American Independence—it has come down to us from their hands embalmed in the best blood of our fathers.—Judge Taney, in the Dred Scott decision that I have just read to you, overrules it, and fritters away the meaning of its glorious words; Democrats, since 1854, grow red in the face when you remind them of it; Judge Douglas tells you that our fathers, who understood these matters better than we do ourselves, did not know the meaning of the terms they were using, that they only meant to say that Englishmen on this side of the Atlantic were equal to Englishmen on the other side; Rufus Choate in making a Democratic speech tells his audience sneeringly that it is a "string of meaningless phrases and glittering generalities;" and Democratic Senator Pettit stands up in the Senate Chamber of this Republic, and denounces this declaration of self-evident truths as a "self-evident *lie*"—and when the people of his own State have repudiated him, the Democratic party give him his reward by appointing him to a judgship in a federal territory. Are there any of my hearers that would be willing to adopt any one of those opinions? Go back with me to those dark and troubleous times of 1776—witness those thirteen dismembered Colonies, just beginning their feeble existence—without an army, without a navy, without tried leaders, without the equipments of warfare, without money, and without organization among themselves;—step into the old State House, in Philadelphia, and look around you upon those sober earnest men, the members of the Continental Congress on the morning of the fourth day of July 1776, when the committee of five before appointed to draft the Declaration of Independence bring in their report—with what breathless attention they listen to the reading of it, their hearts throbbing like muffled drums at the announcement of those immortal truths "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights: that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." And then they go forward, one by one, to sign it, every one of them knowing full well that if they fail in their unequal struggle with England—the most powerful nation on the face of the globe, the beating of whose morning reveille kept equal pace with the sun in his journey around the world, whose victorious navies rode triumphantly the waves of every sea—then that Declaration they were signing would prove the death warrant of every one of them upon the scaffold. Yet they go forward. John Hancock writes his name

"Dashing and bold, as if the writer meant
A double daring in his mind's intent."

And the others—Stephen Hopkins with a palsied hand, but with a fearless and a patriotic heart, writes his name plain enough for the minions of King George to read it; and Charles Carroll, of Carrollton; and Adams, and Gerry, and Sherman, and Morris, and Lee, Rutledge, and Jefferson—"there were giants in those days"—and relying upon the intrinsic justness of their cause, and the self-evident truths of the rights of human nature that they were declaring, to their maintainance they mutually pledged their "lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor." The glories of the Cross of Calvary shall pale away and fade from the remembrance of men, as soon as the moral grandeur and sublimity of that old Declaration shall be dimmed. Pile upon it, pyramid high, the decisions of corrupt and venal courts—beslime it with the mouthings of your Wigfalls, and your Keitts, and your Douglas, and your Pettits, and yet, while there is one man to honor the memories of John Hampden and Algernon Sidney—while there is one human heart groaning beneath oppression, or throbbing with the love of freedom, that old Declaration of American Independence by our fathers, will stand, a beacon light to beckon on to liberty. (Applause.)

Let us see what our fathers said less than two years after the Declaration of Independence—I read from a venerable old book, entitled "Secret Journals of Congress, Domestic affairs—1775—1778"—published by authority of Congress; on April 29, 1778, page 70:

"The committee appointed to prepare proposals to such foreign officers and soldiers as incline to become citizens of America, brought in a report, which being read and amended, was agreed to as follows:

To the officers and soldiers in the service of the King of Great Britain, not subjects of the said King:

The citizens of the United States of America are engaged in a just and necessary war—a war in which they are not the only persons interested. They contend *for the rights of human nature*, and therefore merit the patronage and assistance *of all mankind*. Their success will secure a refuge from persecution and tyranny to those who wish to pursue the dictates of their own consciences, and to reap the fruits of their own industry, &c.

And among those who put forth this language there are at least 16 of the original signers of the Declaration of Independence. Our fathers then were "contending for the rights of human nature," and were "not the only persons interested." Well might they say so—otherwise why should Lafayette, have "taken up his sword in defence of America?" But on June 25, 1778, the adoption of the articles of confederation being under consideration, I find another record, in the same book, page 331:

The delegates from South Carolina, being called on, moved the following amendments in behalf of their State:

1st. In article fourth, between the words "free inhabitants," insert "white."

Passed in the negative. Two ayes, eight noes, one divided.

3d. After the words "several States," insert "according to the law of such States respectively for the government of their own free white inhabitants."

Passed in the negative. Two ayes, eight noes, one divided.

The better to understand these amendments, I now read the fourth article of the Articles of Confederation, *as it would have read* had these amendments offered by South Carolina been adopted:

ARTICLE IV.

The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship among the people of the different States of this Union, the free ("WHITE") inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens of the several States; ("*according to the law of such States respectively for the government of their own free* WHITE *inhabitants*,") and the people of each State shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other State, &c.

Here our fathers had an opportunity, at the motion of the Slave State of South Carolina—a State that has always been kicking out of the traces; that "Old Hickory" taught some things; the legislative Solons of which last winter stood on the steps of their State Capitol and cheered and derided the brutal mobbing of the Irishman Powers because he had declared that in his opinion "white laborers were degraded by being associated with slaves;" that entertained serious intentions of mobbing the pro-slavery Democratic National Convention last spring, which may have been the reason why their second session was adjourned to Baltimore—to restrict the Articles of Confederation to the white race alone. And this was on June 25, 1778, not yet two years after the adoption of the Declaration of Independence—if our fathers had made a mistake in the Declaration, here was an excellent opportunity offered to correct it—did they adopt the restriction? Not by any manner of means. The record is a short one, but very conclusive.—"Passed in the *negative*. Two ayes, eight noes, one divided." At that time the vote was taken by States, and only eleven States represented in convention. I cannot certainly tell who voted against the restriction, but when the Articles of Confederation were finally adopted *without the restriction* they were signed by at least *sixteen* of the original signers of the Declaration of Independence; Josiah Bartlett, John Hancock, Samuel Adams, Elbridge Gerry, William Ellery, Roger Sherman, Oliver Wolcott, Samuel Huntington, Francis Lewis, John Witherspoon, Robert Morris, Thomas McKean, John Penn, Thomas Heyward, Jr., Richard Henry Lee and Francis Lightfoot Lee.

Under those articles of confederation, thus adopted by our fathers, the eight long years of our revolutionary struggle were passed—the declaration of independence was made good, and our liberties placed upon a secure foundation. When the smoke of the battle had rolled away, and the United States of America were recognized a "nation among nations," there arose among ourselves many questions of internal govermental policy; and among them all there was none so important as the territorial question. Some of the States were claiming the title to immense tracts of unsettled country lying west of them, which had been *secured to them* by the revolutionary war, and which others of the original thirteen States, that had no claim under their charters to the unoccupied territory, justly thought should be ceded to the government of the United States at large, as so much of a fund to retrieve from ruin the national treasury. The tenth Continental congress, under the articles of confedera-

tion, assembled at Philadelphia, Nov. 3, 1783, but adjourned next day to Annapolis, Maryland. The House was soon left without a quorum, and so continued most of the time, of course doing no business, till the 1st of March 1784, when the delegates from Virginia, in pursuance of instructions from the legislature of that State, signed the conditional deed of cession to the confederation of all claim to the territory northwest of the Ohio river. New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts had already made similar concessions to the confederation of their claims to the territory westward of their present limits.—Congress hereupon appointed Messrs. Jefferson of Virginia, Chase of Maryland, and Howell of Rhode Island, a select committee to report a plan of government for the western territory. Upon this committee, all were from States that were then and are now slave States. That committee reported, through Thomas Jefferson, the Godfather of old time democracy, a plan, drawn up by Jefferson himself, which provided for the Government of ALL of the western territory, already ceded by the more northern States, and *including* that portion which had not yet been, but which, it was reasonably expected soon would be, surrendered to the confederation by the States of North Carolina and Georgia, and which now forms the States of Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi. I read from that famous report of 1784 so much as is necessary to show that it included *all* of the territory then owned by the United States, and all they expected to own by the cession of the various States, and that it *excluded* slavery, as follows:

Resolved, That the *territory ceded or to be ceded by individual States*, whensoever &c.

Provided, That both the TEMPORARY *and* PERMANENT *governments be established on these principles as their basis:*

1. That they shall forever remain a part of the United States of Amer ca.

2. That in their persons, property and territory, they shall be subject to the government of the United States in Congress assembled, and to the articles of confederation in all those cases in which the original States shall be so subject.

3. That they shall be subject to pay a part of the federal debts, contracted or to be contracted, to be apportioned on them by Congress, according to the same common rule and manner by which the apportionment thereof shall be made on the other States.

4. That their respective governments shall be in Republican forms, and shall admit no person to be a citizen who holds a hereditary title.

5. *That after the year* 1800 *of the christian era, there shall be neither* SLAVERY NOR INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE *in any of the said States*, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted to have been personally guilty.

On the 19th day of April 1784, this plan for the government of the western territory came up for consideration in the old continental congress. Mr. Spaight of North Carolina moved that the fifth proposition, excluding slavery after the year 1800, be stricken out of the plan of ordinance, and Mr. Read of South Carolina seconded the motion. The question was put in this form: "Shall the words moved to be stricken out stand?" and on this question the vote was as follows:

New Hampshire, Mr. Foster, Mr. Blanchard—aye.
Massachusetts, Mr. Gerry, Mr. Partridge—aye.
Rhode Island, Mr. Ellery, Mr. Howell—aye.
Connecticut, Mr. Sherman. Mr. Wadsworth—aye.
New York. Mr. Dewitt, Mr. Paine—aye.
New Jersey. Mr. Dick—aye. No quorum.
Pennsylvania, Mr. Mifflin, Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Hand—aye.
Maryland, Mr. McHenry, Mr. Stone—no.
Virginia, Mr. JEFFERSON–aye, Mr. Hardy–no, Mr. Mercer–no—no.
North Carolina, Mr. Williamson–aye, Mr. Spaight–no—Divided.
South Carolina. Mr. Reed, Mr. Beresford—no.

It is well to look into this vote, for this is the first time in the history of the United States where an attempt was made to form a territorial government; and here we find *sixteen* in favor of Mr. JEFFERSON's restriction, to barely *seven* against it; and the States divided *six* in favor of it to *three* against it. But the articles of confederation, by article nine, required an affirmative vote of all the States—that is, a vote of seven States—to carry a proposition; so this clause was defeated by the absence of *one* delegate from New Jersey, in spite of a vote of *more than two to one in its favor.*—Had the New Jersey delegation been full, it must, to a moral certainty, have prevailed; had Delaware then been represented, it would probably have been carried, even without New Jersey. And in this vote we find at least three men who eight years before had signed the Declaration of Independence, WILLIAM ELLERY, ROGER SHERMAN, and THOMAS JEFFERSON voting *in favor* of Jefferson's restriction, and only one voting against it, a Mr. Stone of Maryland, not a very famous man in history; and these four were all of the men who had signed the Declaration in 1776, that voted on this measure in 1784, being three to one in favor of Jefferson's restriction. We also find that three men, ELBRIDGE GERRY, WILLIAM ELLERY and ROGER SHERMAN, voted on this measure in 1784, who had six years before signed the articles of confederation, after the amendment offered by North Carolina proposing to restrict those articles to the white race alone,

had been so decidedly voted down—and that every one of these men voted in favor of Jefferson's restriction. What kind of a policy do you suppose our fathers were endeavoring to inaugurate in regard to the extension of slavery in the territories? In view of the history of this matter I hope that no Democrat will ever again say that the slavery restriction was voted down in 1784—especially if he be a shrieker for the rule of the majority, yelcpt "popular sovereignty"—voted down by more than two voting in favor of it to one against it.

But the question came up again 3 years afterwards, in the last Congress held under the articles of confederation, which held its session at New York, at the same time the convention that framed the federal constitution was in session at Philadelphia. The States of North Carolina and Georgia, did not, as it was supposed they would do, cede their territory to the general government; and it became necessary to organize a territorial government for the territory northwest of the Ohio river, at that time every foot of territory owned by the United States. The famous northwest ordinance of July 13, 1787, was passed by that Congress *unanimously*, from which I now read, Purple's Statute of Illinois, page 28, as follows:

ARTICLE VI.—*There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory*, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

This great territorial charter, comprised in territorial organization all the immense tract of country north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi rivers, out of which five of the noblest States of this Union, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Michigan, have since been formed; and, mark you, this territorial bill did not, like the one of 1784, propose to abolish slavery after the year 1800 merely, but throttled the monster instantly—the slavery restriction took effect on the very day of the passage of the territorial bill—there could be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in all that territory after the 13th day of July 1787, and the vote on the passage of the bill was *unanimous*. All honor to the fathers, who by this legislative act in our early history, set aside as the patrimony of freedom forever that vast territorial domain, which was every foot then owned by the Republic.—(Applause.)

Time will not permit me to examine the debates in the Constitutional Convention. They drafted a Constitution and submitted it to the people, and the people in their various State conventions approved of it—adopted it as the great charter, to map out, direct and control, all the future legislation of our country. It begins with a preamble, and the preamble begins, "we the people," and I have not learned that the delegates from South Carolina proposed to amend it so as to make it read "we the *white* people," (laughter) for I presume they were pretty well satisfied with their decisive and memorable defeat in an effort of that nature eleven years before. I read from the United States Constitution, Freeman's Illinois digest, pages 60–7.

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

ARTICLE IV, SECTION 3.

1. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.

2. The Congress *shall have power* to dispose of, *and make all needful* RULES *and* REGULATIONS *respecting the territory* or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

The preamble shows the reasons for the adoption of the Constitution "to secure the blessings of *liberty* to ourselves and our posterity," said our fathers; and in article fourth they give Congress the *power* to admit new States, and "make all needful *rules* and *regulations* respecting the territory," out of which new States were to be carved. Here is a direct grant of power to the Congress of the United States in the Constitution, clearly expressed, to "make all needful RULES and REGULATIONS respecting the TERRITORY." And what does that mean? Can Congress make a "rule" or a "regulation" except it be a law?—Certainly not. Well then, if the grant of power had been to "make all *laws* respecting the territory," it would have been no broader than it now is, for Congress can make no "rule" or "regulation" except it take the form of "law." So thought our fathers, for the very first Congress, after the adoption of the Constitution, in pursuance of that grant of power re-adopted by a law the north-west ordinance of 1787. "Jim Allen," the Douglas democratic candidate for Governor of this State, in his joint debate with Senator Trumbull the

other day at Bloomington, argued that the North-west ordinance of 1787 was adopted under the Articles of Confederation, and by the adoption of the Constitution was abrogated, and therefore had no application to the Northwestern Territory at all. But "Jim Allen" knew—he could not help knowing when he made that argument, that the fathers of this republic were careful to see to it that the very first Congress, that convened after the adoption of the Constitution of the United States should pass a law adapting the ordinance of 1787 to the Constitution. If there is a Douglas Democrat in my audience, let me ask him, in all sober earnestness, "what do you think of a man, who, as Democratic candidate for Governor of Illinois, will stand up before an intelligent audience of freemen, and wilfully pervert the plain truths of history, as Mr. Allen did at Bloomington? Will you sustain him in it? Has your party sunk to that low depth of infamy where your leaders must turn their backs upon the fathers of this Republic, and deny their action, and if so, will you longer cling to the failing fortunes of such a party? Listen while I read from the United States statute at large, volume one, (and I have been to the trouble of looking these matters up from original sources, and bringing in these venerable old law books to read to this audience, lest, possibly, some wavering Democrat might "doubt my authority,") (applause) on page 50, as follows :

CHAP. VIII.—*An act to provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the river Ohio.*
Whereas, In order that the ordinance of the United States in Congress assembled, for the government of the territory Northwest of the river Ohio *may continue to have full effect* it is requisite that certain provisions should be made, *so as to adapt the same to the present Constitution of the United States*, &c.

And then the act goes on to make those provisions necessary to *adapt* the ordinance to the Constitution. And this law of the first Congress under the Constitution was approved on August 7, 1789, by GEORGE WASHINGTON as President of the United States, (applause) the very man who was president of the Convention that framed the Constitution. The bill was presented by Hon. THOS. FITZSIMMONS, M. C., from Pennsylvania, on July 16, 1789, when it was read for the first time, who was also a member of the Constitutional Convention. I do not find that the ayes and nayes were ever taken upon the passage of the law; but I do find that there were at least *eight* men, Elbridge Gerry, Roger Sherman, William Floyd, Robert Morris, George Clymer, George Read, Charles Carroll and Richard Henry Lee, who had thirteen years before signed the Declaration of American Independence; and *five* men who had eleven years before signed the Articles of Confederation; and *fifteen* men who were members of the Constitutional Convention, *all of whom*, at the time of the approval of that law, *had taken their seats* in that first Congress of the United States under the Constitution, and I do not find that any one of them ever voted or spoke against its passage. And this law excluded slavery from all the northwestern territory—can you longer doubt what the territorial policy of the fathers was? Did these men, the fathers of the Republic, the framers of those fundamental laws upon which all our liberties rest, know what they were doing?—Did they, from whose hands the Constitution had just come, freshly framed, know the powers granted by that Constitution? No man in his sober senses can deny but that they did—neither can he deny but that those powers were wisely and justly exercised. (Applause.)

However, notwithstanding the fact that slavery had been excluded by law from the territories, there was a Convention held by the people of the territory of Indiana in 1803, which Convention adopted a petition, in which they petitioned Congress among other things, to suspend for ten years the prohibition of slavery contained in their territorial charter; and WILLIAM H. HARRISON, at that time their territorial Governor, afterwards President of the United States, submitted their petition to Congress. Now, if in the history of our government, *there ever was* a time when slavery should be extended into a territory, that time was in 1803. The government was heavily in debt; the country was a wilderness, and at that time farther out on the western frontier than Pike's Peak is now; business was stagnant and dull; the commerce of the Mississippi valley was carried on by clumsy barges and flat boats, instead of the magnificent steamers of the present day; the shrill whistle of the "iron horse" had not yet resounded through the western wilderness; the harvests were gathered by the handsickle or scythe, instead of the patent reaper; in the fall, the drumming of the flail was heard, instead of the humming of a patent thresher; in short, the materialistic progress of the age was then in its

earliest infancy. But what did our fathers do with the petition of the people of Indiana? They appointed a special Committee of three to consider it, and John Randolph of Roanoke, himself a slaveholder, who was chairman of that Committee, reported thereon, on the 2d day of March, 1803, in the following language:

"The rapid population of the State of Ohio sufficiently evinces, in the opinion of your Committee, that the labor of slaves is not necessary to promote the growth and settlement of colonies in that region; that this labor—demonstrably the dearest of any—can only be employed in the cultivation of products more valuable than any known to that quarter of the United States; that the Committee deem it *highly dangerous and inexpedient to impair a provision wisely calculated to promote the happiness and prosperity of the northwestern country*, and to give strength and security to that extensive frontier. In the *salutary operation* of this *sagacious and benevolent restraint*, it is believed that the inhabitants of Indiana will, at no very distant day, find *ample remuneration* for a temporary privation of labor, and of emigration."

And in their report recommended the passage of the following resolution:

"*Resolved*, That it is *inexpedient to suspend for a limited time*, the operation of the sixth article of the compact between the original States and the people and States northwest of the river Ohio."

And so the people of Indiana had to do without Slavery. Our fathers thought it "highly dangerous and inexpedient to impair a provision wisely calculated to promote the happiness and prosperity of the North Western country." Honor them for it, (applause) for they saved from the curse of human bondage the soil of our own State of Illinois, then included within the territorial district of Indiana.

Yet the people of that territory were not satisfied, and five times, for five years in succession, from 1803 to 1807, they went up to Congress with a similar petition, and never once was their petition granted. And every time they thus petitioned, they acknowledged the authority of Congress to legislate in the premises; for if the law that they were petitioning to have repealed was unconstitutional, then it was no law, and the people of the then territory of Indiana might have wholly disregarded it.

I find some amusing things in looking up this old record, and I think I have discovered the author of Squatter Sovereignty, notwithstanding Mr. Douglas speaks of it as "my great principle"—at least it is the earliest mention of it that I have found. When Gen. Arthur St. Clair was governor of the northwestern territory, he made a speech before the territorial legislature, at Chilicothe, in which he said:

For all internal affairs we have a complete Legislature of our own, and in them are no more bound by an act of Congress than by an Edict of the First Consul of France.

I hope Mr. Douglas in the next speech he makes down East, will acknowledge his indebtedness to Gen. St. Clair. (Laughter). Well, at that time THOMAS JEFFERSON was President of the United States, and JAMES MADISON, the father of the Constitution, was his Secretary of State. When this clause of Gen. St. Clair's speech was shown to JEFFERSON and his cabinet, what do you suppose they did? They wrote a "love-letter" (laughter) to the father of Squatter Sovereignty, in these words:

SIR: The President obesrving in an address lately delivered by you to the Convention at Chilicothe, an intemperate and indecorum of language towards the Legislature of the United States, and a disorganizing spirit and tendency of every evil example, and grossly violating the rules of conduct enjoined by your public station, determines that your commission of Governor of the Northwestern Territory shall cease on the receipt of this notification.

I am, &c.,

JAMES MADISON.

Arthur St Clair, Esq., Chilicothe.

Thus thought the good old democratic administration of THOMAS JEFFERSON, and they cut off the head of Gen. St Clair (applause.) The modern democratic Presidents, Frank Pierce and "Jeems" Buchanan, have never doubted their constitutional authority to cut off the heads of Territorial Governors, as attested in the long list of Kansas Governors that have been decapitated. But there is this difference between the modern democracy and the old time democracy—Buchanan cuts off the heads of territorial Governors because they do not favor Slavery, but JEFFERSON applied the executive executionary guillotine because St. Clair did not favor liberty. (applause.) When "Honest Old Abe" is elected President of these United States, and the Governor of some territory shall be insisting that he may curse the soil of the infant State with slavery, we expect ABRAHAM LINCOLN to direct his Secretary of State to write him just such a "love letter" as THOMAS JEFFERSON directed his Secretary of State to write to Gen. St. Clair. (Laughter and applause.)

Not long ago, a democrat, with an air of conscious triumph put this question to me, "why did Jefferson, and Madison and the fathers of this Republic, permit Slavery in the territory of Kentucky?" My answer was, that they did not, for Kentucky never passed through a territorial organization at all; at no time in the history of this Republic has the jurisdiction of the U. S. extended over Kentucky in other capacity *than as a State*—our fathers did not suppose, nor

does the Republican party to-day suppose, that there is any authority in Congress to exclude Slavery *from a State*; the Republican party, however, believes that Congress has the authority to exclude Slavery from a *territory*—and so thought our fathers, and so they acted. Kentucky was formed within the limits of one of the original States, in which Slavery existed, and it was in that way that Slavery was entailed upon Kentucky.

But what about Tennessee and Mississippi, in the Southwestern territory? Let us look into the history of that matter. I read from 1st U. S. Statute at Large, page 123:

CHAP. xiii.—*An Act for the Government of the Territory of the United States, South of the River Ohio.* SECTION 1. *Be it enacted by the Senate* "&c &c" And the government of the said Territory South of the Ohio, shall be similar to that which is now exercised in the territory northwest of the Ohio; *except* so far as is otherwise provided in the conditions expressed in an Act of Congress of the present session, entitled "an act to accept the Cession of claims of the State of North Carolina, to a certain district of Western territory."

Now let us turn to the Deed of Cession by North Carolina, and see what the *exception*, above referred to IS. In same book, page 108, I read as follows:

Provided always, That no regulation made or to be made by Congress, shall tend to emancipate Slaves.

The Deed of Cession by the State of Georgia contained a similar provision to this one in the Deed of Cession from North Carolina. The reason why our fathers did not exclude Slavery from the Southwestern territory is now plainly apparent. The very deeds of Cession through which the U. S. acquired jurisdiction over that territory, had special clauses prohibiting Congress from *exercising* that authority—not denying but that Congress had authority to make such a regulation for a territory, but saying, that if Congress accepts of our Deeds of Cession, Congress shall do so *upon the condition* not to exclude Slavery. By putting these conditions in their deeds of cession, the people of North Carolina and Georgia plainly admitted the authority of Congress, without those conditions, to have excluded Slavery. And more than that, they plainly admitted that they well knew what the territorial policy of our fathers was, and that they were afraid that Congress would, in pursuance of their power under the Constitution, exclude Slavery from that territory, if they should, in good faith, as the more northern States had before done, cede to the United States their territory untrammelled by such a condition. History will not permit us to lay the blame of Slavery in the Southwestern territory at the doors of Congress. The odium must rest alone upon the people of North Carolina and Georgia.

Merely remarking that preparatory to the admission of all five of the Northwestern States, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Michigan, Congress, by a law, referred to and acknowledged the binding authority of the ordinance of 1787, similar to the Act of Congress preparatory to the admission of Illinois; I now read that act, 3d U. S. Statute at large, pages 429-30:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That the inhabitants of the territory of Illinois be, and they are hereby, authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State government &c, &c.

Provided, That the same, whenever formed, shall be Republican, *and not repugnant* to the ordinance of the thirteenth of July, seventeen hundred and eighty seven, between the original States and the people and states of the territory northwest of the River Ohio.

APPROVED, April 18, 1818.

So you see that when the people of our own State of Illinois wished to adopt a Constitution, Congress passed an ennabling act, just as Congress did in the case of Kansas, in which Congress was careful to provide that no "provision wisely calculated to promote the happiness and prosperity of the Northwestern country" contained in the old ordinance of 1787 should in any way be abrogated or impaired. Do you remember the provision of the "English Bill"—the ennabling act for Kansas—offering to admit her immediately, and bribing her with a land grant, if she would come in as a Slave State, but denying her admission under her free State constitution? Compare that effort of the Democracy, to force Slavery upon a new State, with the careful action of our fathers to keep Slavery out.

Illinois adopted a free State Constitution and came into the Union. It was long after the adoption of this constitution that Dred Scott was held at Rock Island, in this State, for two years, as a slave. I read from the old constitution of Illinois, 1st Purple's Statute, 31:

The people of the Illinois territory, having the right of admission into the general government as a member of the Union, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, the ordinance of Congress of 1787, and the law of Congress approved April 18, 1818, entitled "An act to enable the people of the Illinois territory to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such State into the Union, on an equal footing with the original States, and for other purposes," in order to establish justice, promote the welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity, do, by their representatives in convention, ordain and establish the following Constitution or form of government, and do

mutually agree with each other to form themselves into a FREE and independent State by the name of the State of Illinois.

ARTICLE VIII.—That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and unalterably established WE DECLARE:

Sec. 1.—That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights; among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.

Who will say that with such a constitution a slave may be held for one hour upon the soil of Illinois; and yet Dred Scott was held as a slave in our State two years, and the supreme court of the United States has decided that it gave him no title to his freedom.

Now came the compromise of 1820, famous in the history of our country; that Stephen A. Douglas first "canonized in the hearts of the American people" and declared "no ruthless hand could be found reckless enough to disturb," and then with his own "ruthless hand" tore down, and trampled into the dust. I read from the act of Congress, approved March 6, 1820, 3d U. S. Stat. at large, page 548:

SEC 8.—*And be it further enacted*, That in ALL THAT TERRITORY ceded by France to the United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude, not included within the limits of the State contemplated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall be, and is hereby, FOREVER PROHIBITED.

Thus said our fathers in 1820, and by that law, as with a shield of freedom, they covered all of the territory then owned by the United States west of the Mississippi river and north of the line of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, except the State of Missouri; and that was the "Compromise"—upon condition that Missouri came in a slave State, the balance, stretching westward as far as our possessions went, and northward to the British possessions, was dedicated to liberty forever. By the articles of Cession of this Louisiana territory it was stipulated that no rights of property of the citizens of that country should be impaired after the cession, and it was claimed, inasmuch as slaves were held by the old French settlers in the settlement of St. Louis before the cession of the territory to the United States, that if Congress excluded slavery from the territory within the limits of the proposed State of Missouri, those rights of property would be impaired. However, no such objection could be made to excluding slavery from that part of the territory which our fathers did exclude it from, for every slave held within the Louisiana purchase before it was ceded to the United States would be included within the limits of the State of Missouri. The territory from which slavery was "forever prohibited" by this Compromise of 1820, included both Kansas and Nebraska, and also that "degree and a half, being more than five times the size of the State of New York" which Mr. Douglas, in the Senate on the 16th of May last, boastfully proclaimed to the South, that his principle of "non-intervention" had given to slavery. The witty and talented Talleyrand was once asked the meaning of the word non intervention; his reply was, "it is a word frequently used in European diplomacy and means much the same thing as intervention." Should the principle of Mr. Douglas prevail, the verdict of the coming generation must be, "non intervention means intervention to extend slavery over the soil from which our fathers had excluded it."

It is claimed that the Compromise measures of 1850 were settled by, and adopted upon Mr. Douglas' principle of "popular sovereignty;" and I myself have heard "Dick Richardson," now running for Congress, on the Democratic ticket in the fifth District, when Democratic candidate for Governor of Illinois, and Stephen A. Douglas in his speech here in Freeport, in front of Mayers' Hotel, on October 27th, 1854, in support of that proposition, read the clause I now read from the bill establishing a Territorial Government for New Mexico; United States Statute at large, 31st Congress, page 447:

And provided, further, That, WHEN ADMITTED AS A STATE, the said territory, or any portion of the same, shall be received into the Union, with or without slavery, as their Constitution may prescribe *at the time of their admission.*

But in 1854, I doubted the fact that any "popular sovereignty" was conferred upon the people of that territory by that clause put into their territorial bill in 1850, and I have been growing more and more doubtful upon that point ever since. It confers no power whatever upon the people of the *territory*, it is confined, by its plain terms, to their action as a STATE.—Mr. Douglas *claims* that he has a precedent for his Kansas Nebraska Bill in the legislation of 1850; but his *claiming so* does not *make it so*; and I defy any man to place his finger upon a single line or word in all the legislation of 1850, that will in any manner sustain the pretensions of Mr. Douglas.

I have not time to look into the debates of 1850—and if I had, our brother Wide Awake, Mr. Ingalls, did it so well two weeks ago that I would desist. It was sought at that time to apply the "Wilmot proviso" to the territory then organized. Clay and Webster, and their compatriots, regarded it as unnecessary, and only calculated to breed bad feelings, for the laws of Mexico had already, as early as 1829, abolished slavery in that territory; and Clay and Webster well knew that after Mexico was annexed to the United States, all Mexican laws which were not contrary to the Constitution of the United States, nor repealed by some proper authority, would be just as much in force as they ever were. Should Illinois be subjugated and annexed to Canada, every law upon our Statute book, not contrary to the British Constitution, would remain in force until repealed. And so it was with Mexico. She had abolished slavery. Let me read the law:

The President of the United Mexican States, to the inhabitants of the Republic—

Be it known: That in the year 1829, being desirous of signalizing the anniversary of our Independence by an act of national Justice and Beneficence, which may contribute to the strength and support of such inestimable welfare, as to secure more and more the public tranquility, and reinstate an unfortunate portion of our inhabitants in the sacred rights granted them by nature, and may be protected by the nation, under wise and just laws, according to the provision in article 30 of the Constitutive act; availing myself of the extraordinary facilities granted me, I have thought proper to decree:

1. That slavery be exterminated in the republic.
2. Consequently those are free, who, up to this day, have been looked upon as slaves.
3. Whenever the circumstances of the public treasury will allow it, the owners of slaves shall be idemnified, in the manner which the laws shall provide.

Mexico, 15th Sept. 1829, A. D.

JOSE MARIA de BOCANEGRA.

Was there not sufficient reason why the Wilmot Proviso should not be applied to the territory acquired of Mexico? Slavery does not exist by the law of nature—nor has it any foundation whatever in common law—it can exist only by *positive statute law*—and in the territory acquired of Mexico, a law to establish it was not only lacking, but, by positive law, slavery had been actually abolished.

But in looking over the legislation of 1850, I find a clause in all the territorial bills then passed, simular to the one in the Territorial Bill of New Mexico, which I do not remember to have ever heard read by Senator Douglas, or any other Democrat, in support of "popular sovereignty;" it reads as follows. U. S. laws, 31st Congress, page 449:

All the laws passed by the legislative assembly and Governor shall be submitted to the Congress of the United States, and, if DISAPPROVED, *shall be* NULL *and of* NO EFFECT.

So you see that Clay and Webster voted against applying the Wilmot Proviso to New Mexico, because slavery was already abolished there; but for fear that the territorial legislature should undertake to introduce slavery, they specially provided, as our fathers were always careful to do, that *all territorial laws* should be submitted to Congress, and if "disapproved should be null and of no effect." How much "popular sovereignty" did that bill contain?—To show you that territorial laws have been disapproved, and that too by our fathers, I read you from a law passed by Congress, as early as May 8, 1792; 1st U. S. Statute at large, page 286:

SEC. 6. *And be it further enacted*, That the limitation act passed by the Governor and Judges of the said territory, the twenty-eighth day of December, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, be and hereby is disapproved.

Our fathers were only exercising over the territories the guardian care conferred upon Congress by the Constitution—just as the Democratic administration of THOMAS JEFFERSON exercised it in the removal of Governor St. Clair.

I have now traced the *legislation* of our country from 1776 up to 1854, and I find it uniformly and always in favor of liberty—never for once departing from the policy inaugurated by the fathers. The claim set up by the followers of Mr. Douglas that theirs is the old time policy, is wholly without foundation in fact. The Kansas Nebraska Bill has *no* precedent in all the history of our Republic. The Democratic party in 1854 took a new shoot, not veering off sideways from the course laid down by the founders of the government, but wheeling squarely around and going straight backwards. Our fathers were marching straight forward, with "liberty" inscribed upon all their banners! But the Democracy is marching directly backwards toward slavery and bondage. It is unnecessary to add that the Nebraska Bill and Dred Scott decision utterly overruled and overrides all of the previous legislation of our country.

I now come to the second division, to the decisions of the supreme courts of various States, in cases where questions similar to those in the Dred Scott case have been decided, and where this legislation of our fathers has been, *not* declared to be unconstitutional, but *sustained* and *enforced*.

I read first from a case decided by the supreme court of the State of Massachusetts in 1836. The facts in this case were that a resident of New Orleans went to Massachusetts and took with him a slave servant, intending soon to return to New Orleans. A writ of Habeas Corpus was brought, and the court held that the slave could not be taken back—his being brought into a free State by his master made him free. Commonwealth vs. Aves, 18 Pickering, 219, the court, in considering the clause in the United States constitution for the rendition of fugitives from justice, say:

The constitution and law manifestly refer to a slave *escaping* from a State where he *owes service or labor* into another State or Territory. He is termed a fugitive from labor; the proof to be made is, that he owed service or labor, under the laws of the State or Territory *from which he fled*. This language can, by no reasonable construction, be applied to the case of a slave who has not *fled* from the State, but who has been *brought into the State by his master*.

It will be remembered that Dred Scott had not *fled* from a State, but that he was brought by his master to the State of Illinois and held two years, and taken by his master to Ft. Snelling. Democrats tell you that Judge Taney did not decide that slaveholders could hold their slaves in Illinois. Well, if he did not decide quite that, he did decide that holding Dred Scott a slave in this State two years did not make him free. But the court on page 210 say:

Without pursuing this inquiry further, it is sufficient for the purposes of the case before us, that by the Constitution adopted in 1780, slavery was abolished in Massachusetts, upon the ground that it is contrary to natural right and the plain principles of justice. The terms of the first article of the declaration of rights are plain and explicit. "All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, which are, the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, and that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property." It would be difficult to select words more precisely adapted to the abolition of negro slavery.

That is the only abolition of slavery, I think, that ever took place in Massachusetts. And the Constitution of Illinois is almost precisely similar to the Constitution of Massachusetts. It is a noticeable fact, too, that the Constitution of Massachusetts was adopted in 1780, and the Constitution of the United States was not framed until seven years afterwards, in 1787; so that by the plain law of Massachusetts negroes did have "rights which white men were bound to respect." Who can believe that it was intended that the Constitution of the United States would make chattel property of a class of people who were freemen in the commonwealth of Massachusetts?

And I read from the case of Merry vs. Chexnaider, by the supreme court of the slave State of Louisiana, in 1830, reported in 20 Martin's Louisiana Reports, page 699:

The plaintiff sues in this action to recover his freedom, and from the evidence on record, is clearly entitled to it. He was born in the North Western Territory, since the enactment by Congress, in 1787, of the ordinance for the government of that country, according to the sixth article of which, "there could be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude." This ordinance fixed forever the character of the population in the region over which it extended, and takes away all foundation from the claim set up in this instance by the defendant. The act of cession by Virginia did not deprive Congress of the power to make such a regulation. The plaintiff accordingly is free.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana did not doubt the authority of Congress to exclude slavery from the territory, and when a black man was suing in their courts, claiming his liberty under that act of Congress, just as Dred Scott did in Missouri, they enforced the law, and let the slave go free.

Let us see what the Supreme Court of Mississipi have said. I read from the case of Harvey vs. Decker and Hopkins, decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, at the June term, 1818, Walker's Miss. R. 36:

The facts in this case are not controverted. The three negroes were slaves in Virginia; in 1784, they were taken by John Decker to the neighborhood of Vincennes; they remained there until July, 1816; the Ordinance of Congress was passed in 1787, and the Constitution of Indiana was adopted on the 29th day of June, 1816. It is contended on the one side, that by the cession act of Virginia, these negroes are slaves; and on the other, that *by the Ordinance of* 1787, and the Constitution of Indiana they are free. The services of the negroes are claimed as a vested right. What is a vested right? Slavery is condemned by reason and the laws of nature. It can only exist through municipal regulations, and in matters of doubt, the courts must lean *in favorem vitæ et libertatis*. [In favor of life and liberty.] * * *

The treaty of cession by Virginia to the United States, which guarantees to the inhabitants of the northwestern territory, their titles, rights and liberties, does not render void that article of the Ordinance of Congress of 1787, which prohibits slavery in that territory; that slaves within the limits of the northwestern territory became *freemen by virtue of the Ordinance of* 1787, *and can assert their claims to freedom in the courts of the State of Mississippi*.

Compare that decision with the Dred Scott case. The slave State of Mississippi leaning "in favor of life and liberty," and deciding that Congress could prohibit slavery in the northwestern territory, and that the Supreme Court of Mississippi would enforce that act of Congress, and would set at liberty the three negroes then held in slavery in Mississippi, because they had once resided in the northwestern territory, from which Congress had prohibited slavery—the negroes being taken to the territory before the passage of the Ordinance of 1787, but held there after its passage.

I now read from the case of the State of Indiana vs. Lasselle, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1820, 1st Blackfords Ind. Reports, page 60:

The question is as to the legality of Lassell's claim to hold Polly as a slave. It is contended for Polly, that *by the Ordinance of* 1787. and the Constitution of Indiana, which was adopted in 1816, she is entitled to her freedom. In the eleventh article of our Constitution, section 7. it is decided, that, "there shall be neither slavery nor unvoluntary servitude in this State, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is evident from this provision, that the framers of our Constitution intended a total and entire prohibition of slavery in this State; and we can conceive of no words in which that intention could have been more clearly expressed. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and Polly discharged.

I do not own a copy of the Missouri Reports, and do not know of a copy being owned in town; but in 2d Gillman's Illinois Reports, I find that Judge SCATES, who delivered the opinion of the court in the case of Jarrot vs. Jarrot, quoted the prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri, as follows:

In the case of Winney vs. Whiteside, 1st Mo. Reports, page 472. it was held that the negro woman, who had been taken into the Illinois territory since the Ordinance of 1787 by her owners, who resided there four years, *thereby became free*, and upon being taken afterwards to the State of Missouri, was not remitted again to the State of slavery, *and that Congress under the Confederation had the power to pass the Ordinance.*

In the case of John Merry vs. Tiffin & Menard, 1st Mo. 725, the mother of the plaintiff had been held as a slave in Virginia and taken into the Illinois before the Ordinance of 1787, and held in slavery there before and after its passage, and the plaintiff was born there after the Ordinance. It was held that he was free.

These two cases were decided in the Supreme Court of Missouri in the year 1827, before the "Blue Lodges" had been organized all over that State, and the insane effort made on the part of the people of Missouri to force slavery upon the unwilling people of Kansas. They were made at a time when there was no undue excitement or agitation upon the slavery question, and it may fairly be presumed that the Judges of the Supreme Court of Missouri gave these important questions their careful consideration before rendering their decisions.—These two decisions were made, too, upon the same principles, and precisely in accordance with every decision rendered by any civilized tribunal upon the face of the globe, from the decision of Lord Mansfield, in the Somersett case, in 1772, up to the time of those decisions. And in these two cases we have precisely the same facts of the Dred Scott case. Dred Scott was taken into territory and for six years held as a slave, from which Congress had excluded slavery; but Judge Taney says the Constitution carries slavery into the territory, and Congress could not exclude it, and that Dred Scott is still a slave. In the first case in the Supreme Court of Missouri, Winny vs. Whiteside, the negro woman was taken into the territory from which Congress had excluded slavery and held as a slave four years; and the Supreme Court of Missouri in 1826 say, Congress had the right to exclude slavery, and therefore the negro woman is free. The two children of Dred Scott were born in territory from which Congress had excluded slavery; but Judge Taney says Congress had no right to exclude slavery, and dooms the children of Dred Scott to bondage forever. In the second case in the Supreme Court of Missouri, John Merry vs. Tiffin and Menard, John Merry, the plaintiff, was born in territory from which Congress had excluded slavery, and the Supreme Court of Missouri say, Congress had the right to exclude slavery, and John Merry is therefore free.

But let us see what the Supreme Court of our own State of Illinois have said. I read from the case of Choisser vs. Hargrave, decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, at December term, 1836, 1st Scam—317-18; from the syllabus:

The act of 1837, of the territory of Indiana, in relation to the indenturing and registering negroes and mulattoes, is clearly in violation of the Ordinance of 1787, and *is therefore void.*

And from the opinion of the Court:

This action, for assault and false imprisonment, was brought by the defendant in error, Barney Hargrave, a colored man, against John Choisser, (who claimed the defendant in error as an indentured servant,) to try his right to freedom. By the Ordinance of Congress for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio, passed in 1787, it is declared, "there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."

And after reviewing the indentured servant act of the territory of Indiana, at some length, which was passed at a time when Illinois was part of that territory, the court says:

This act of the Territorial Legislature, is clearly in violation of the Ordinance of 1787, and consequently *void.*

So you see that the Supreme Court of this State were clearly of the opinion, and so decided, that Congress had authority to pass the Ordinance of 1787, and that no territorial laws in any way violating that Ordinance, was of any force, but was *void.*

But I find another case decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, at December term, 1845, Jarrot vs. Jarrot, 2d Gilman 1. I read from the syllabus:

An action of assumpsit for services rendered may be maintained by a colored man, and thereby try the question of his right to freedom.

The descendants of the slaves of the old French settlers, born since the adoption of the Ordinance of 1787, and before or since the Constitution of the State

of Illinois was adopted, cannot be held in slavery in this State.

And from Judge SCATES who delivered the opinion of the court:

After so many, and such uniformity of judicial determinations upon the meaning, and the application of the Constitution and Ordinance to facts and circumstances like these before the court, made in so benignant a spirit of humanity and justice, I cannot allow my mind to doubt of the plaintiff's "inherent and indefeasible rights," to become "equally free and independent" with other citizens, "and of enjoying and defending life and liberty and of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing" his "own happiness," except so far as he may, by the Constitution and laws, be restricted or denied the right of suffrage, &c. All philanthropists unite in deprecating the evils of slavery, and it affords me sincere pleasure, when my duty under the Constitution and laws requires me to break the fetters of the slave, and declare the captive free.

The law presumes every man to be innocent of crime. The benefit of every doubt is given to the accused, and the presumption allowed to prevail. Should less force and efficacy be allowed the presumption of freedom in rebutting such doubts, as contemporaneous constructions are admissible to remove? The conviction of a crime may doom the accused to temporary loss of liberty; the solution of a doubt against the plaintiff will doom him to slavery, to bondage for life. If the scales of justice are equally balanced, the law inclines to mercy. If I entertained a doubt I should be compelled to decide in favor of liberty. But as the Courts of Massachusetts and Mississippi declared, so it appears to my mind too plain to admit of construction, "there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory," as declared by the Ordinance.

This Court decided at the December term 1840, in the case of *Kinney vs. Cook*, 2 Scam. 233, and again at the July term 1841, in the case of *Bailey vs. Cromwell*, 3 do. 71, "that the presumption of law in this State was, that every person was free, without regard to color.

I have now quoted sufficiently from the decisions of the Supreme Courts of the various States to show you clearly the current of those decisions. Indiana, Mississippi, Louisiana, Missouri and Illinois, have invariably sustained the legislation of the fathers. I do not believe that one single decision can be produced, made by the Supreme Court of any State in the Union, up to the Dred Scott case, where a contrary opinion has ever been held.

I now pass to the third and last division —to an examination of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, when MARSHALL and STORY were upon the bench. I here remark that there is not a respectable court in the civilized world, in which the decisions of those judges would not be taken as binding authority. Should I read in the English Parliament, the highest court of appeal in England, from an opinion delivered by Judge STORY, the authority would be considered of as great weight, and entitled to as much respect, as any authority I might read from Lord BACON or Sir WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. By their acknowledged purity and honesty, their ripe and schollarly erudition, they have so interwoven their names in the jurisprudence of the age in which they lived, as to render them immortal. Tell me that Taney can override MARSHALL and STORY, and that his decision must be a *finality!* As well tell me that the latest lie must be followed instead of the earlier truth—that Wrong will triumph over Right.

I read first from the case of the American Insurance Company, et al. vs. Canter, 1st Peters United States Supreme Court Reports, page 542, decided at January term 1828, when JOHN MARSHALL was Chief Justice, and the associate judges were Burshrod Washington, William Johnson, Gabriel Duval, Joseph Story, Smith Thompson, and Robert Trimble. This case was not decided by a divided court, like the Dred Scott case, but the associate judges all agreed with Chief Justice MARSHALL, who, in delivering the opinion of the Court says:

They do not, however, participate in political power; they do not share the government until Florida shall become a State. In the meantime, Florida continues to be a territory of the United States; *governed by virtue of that clause in the Constitution*, which empowers Congress "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, or other property belonging to the United States."

Perhaps the power of governing a territory belonging to the United States, which has not by becoming a State acquired the means of self-government, may result necessarily from the facts, that it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular State, and is within the jurisdiction of the United States. The right to govern may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory. Whichever may be the source whence the power is derived *the possession of it is unquestioned.*

What do you Douglasites think of *this* decision made by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1828, by an unanimous Court? Do you think that Judges MARSHALL and STORY were not capable of deciding a question of Constitutional law? We Republicans say that Congress has the right to exclude Slavery from the territories; and to sustain us in that position we point you to the legislation of the country for seventy-eight years; to the North West ordinance of 1787, by which our fathers excluded Slavery from the territory of our own State of Illinois, and kept it for us, their children, an inheritance of freedom; to the compromise of 1820, which excluded Slavery from the young State of Iowa and the territory West, including Kansas and Nebraska, that the "ruthless hand" of Judge Douglas "impared"; and to the Supreme Court of the United States in the days of its prestine glory. You declaim for popular sovereignty, and to what can you point? You

cannot place your finger upon a single law in all the Statute books of America, up to July 21st 1854, that will maintain you in your position. Among all of the decisions that have ever been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States, you can not find a single decision by which *you* are sustained. Even the Dred Scott case, to which you are so firmly bound by the Wickliffe resolution, "crushes out" all idea of popular sovereignty, and places *the right to hold slaves* above and beyond every other right of the people of America. How much longer will you cling to that hollow mockery?

I now read from the case of LeGrand vs. Darnall, decided in 1829, 2d Peters, 664. This case came up from Maryland, on the following facts: "Bennett Darnall, of Ann Arundel County, State of Maryland, by his will, dated August 4th 1810, devised to *his son*, Nicholas Darnall, the defendant in this case, certain lands lying in the county and State aforesaid. The mother of the said Nicholas was the Slave of the testator, *and Nicholas was born a Slave to his father.*" You all know a slave follows the condition of the mother.

LeGrand the White man, purchased of Nicholas Darnall, the negro, the land devised to him for which he gave the negro his notes. When the notes became due LeGrand would not pay, and the negro sued him. LeGrand obtained an injunction, on the ground that the Negro could not convey real estate, (had "no rights which a white man was bound to respect,") but the courts of Maryland so far favored the negro, that the injunction was dissolved. LeGrand the White man, appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States; and that Court constituted precisely as it was one year before, in the case I have just read you, with JOHN MARSHALL, and JOSEPH STORY on the bench, by an unanimous opinion, not a single judge dissenting, in rendering the opinion of the Court, use the following language:

The time of the *freedom* of the appellee commenced immediately after the death of the testator, when, according to the evidence, he was about eleven years old. Four respectable witnesses of the neighborhood were examined. They all agree in their testimony that Nicholas was well grown, healthy, and inteligent, and of good bodily and mental capacity; that he and his brother Henry could readily have found employment, either as house servant boys, or on a farm, or as apprintices; and that they were able to work and and gain a livelihood. The testator devised to each of them real and personal estate to a considerable amount. They had guardians appointed, were well educated, and Nicholas is now living in affluence Experience has proved that he was able to work, and gain a sufficient maintainance and livelihood. No doubt has even been entertained as to the fact by any who know him. OF COURSE, *he was capable in law to sell and dispose of the whole or part of his estate, and to execute the necessary instruments of writing to convey a sufficient title to the purchaser.*

The Court of appeals of Maryland, in the case of Hale vs Mullin, decided, that a *devise of property*, real or personal by a master to his slave, entitles the slave to his *freedom, by necessary implication.* This Court entertains the *same* opinion.

Here we find the Supreme Court of the United States deciding that a negro *has* rights which a white man is bound to respect—that when a white man buys property of a negro in Maryland, and gives his note, he must pay the note. More than that, that the negro was *entitled to his freedom by necessary implication*, because his master had devised to him real estate; and that he could hold and sell real estate, and make a sufficient title therefor, and was, withal "inteligent and living in affluence." At that early day the Supreme Court of the United States was willing to lend its aid to assist a negro to collect a note that was due to him by a white man.

There is one thing in this case of LeGrand vs. Darnall, that to me is a little amusing. At that time, in 1829, Roger B. Taney was not a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, but he was practicing, as an attorney at law, in Maryland, and when this white man LeGrand, was trying to cheat the negro Darnall, out of the pay for his farm, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, was the attorney of Mr LeGrand. (Laughter.) It is a fact—the book says, "Mr Taney, for the appellant." So you see that Mr. Taney himself, at that time, entertained the opinion that a negro "could be sued" in the Supreme Court of the United States, for he sued him—Chief Justice Taney sued a "nigger". (Laughter) our fathers went to war upon the principle of "no taxation without representation." That maxim, however, has some exceptions. I do not know of any exception to the legal rule that the "liability" of any person to be sued in a court, carries with it the corresponding "privilege" of that person to sue in that court. But Taney would reverse all that. When he would sue a negro, he would have the court open to him for that purpose; but when a negro would bring a suit, and that, too, to try the most important question that ever judicial tribunal, passed upon—the question of Dred Scott's liberty and the liberty of his children, Mr. Taney meets him at the very threshold with the declaration, "you cant bring a suit—negroes have no rights which white men are bound to respect." The United States

Supreme Court thought differently in 1829, and in this case Mr. Roger B. Taney was "cleaned out" by the negro. (Laughter and applause.)

The next case I read is Groves et al vs Slaughter, 15 Peters 449, decided by the Supreme Court in 1841. This case was upon the construction of Miss. constitution adopted in 1732, by which the introduction of slaves into that State for sale or merchandise was prohibited after May 1st 1833. Notwithstanding the prohibition, Slaughter took slaves to Mississippi after that, and sold them, taking notes for them, and this is a suit on the collection of the notes.—HENRY CLAY, as the attorney of Slaughter, made an argument in this case, from which I read the following paragraph:

In considering this question, it is necessary to look at the situation of the slaves in Mississippi, carried into the State after May, 1833, for sale or merchandise. Are they free? If they were free, it would be some consolation. But there is no freedom for those persons in Mississippi; and those who purchased them, and seek now to escape from paying for them, and against moral rectitude insist on their ownership, acquired by a violation of the Constitution of Mississippi. It would be gratifying to those who love freedom, if the negroes were free. And who does not love freedom?

Such is the language used by HENRY CLAY in the argument of a law case. Who shall say that he did not love freedom?—I read from the opinion of the Court:

By the *laws of certain States*, slaves are treated as property; and the Constitution of Mississippi prohibits their being brought into that State by citizens of other States, for sale, or as merchandise. Merchandise is a comprehensive term, and may include every article of traffic, whether foreign or domestic, which is properly embraced by a commercial regulation. But if slaves are considered in *some of the States* as Merchandise, that *cannot divest them of the leading and controling quality of PERSONS by which they are designated in the Constitution.* The character of *property* is given them by the *local law*. This law is respected, and all rights under it are protected by the federal authorities; *but the Constitution acts upon slaves as PERSONS and NOT as property.* The power over slavery belongs to the STATES respectively. It is *local* in its character, and in its effects.

And Roger B. Taney, who at that time was on the bench, in delivering a seperate opinion in this case, on page 508, says:

In my judgement, the power over this subject is EXCLUSIVELY with the several States.

Even judge Taney did not at that time believe that the Constitution carried Slavery anywhere—he thought the power over the subject was "*exclusively with the several States.*" Slavery being a matter for the *States* to regulate, it can only exist by *a State law*. State laws can have no force outside of the State which make them. If the State of Maryland by a law makes lotteries legal in that State, whoever would have a lottery and be protected by that law, must stay in the State of Maryland—he cannot go to any other State, or to any territory, or anywhere out of Maryland with his lottery. If the State of Virginia shall by a law, say that in that State negroes may be held in slavery, he who would hold a slave, and be protected by that law, must stay in the State of Virginia—he cannot go into any other state, or into a territory, or anywhere out of Virginia. The State law of Virginia, by which he holds his Slave, cannot be extended beyond the limits of that state.

I have one more case to read—16th Peters, 538—Prigg vs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Judge STORY, who delivered the opinion of the Court, says:

By the general law of nations, no nation is bound to recognise the state of slavery, as to foreign slaves found within its territorial dominions, when it is in opposition to its own policy and institutions, in favor of the subjects of other nations where slavery is recognised. If it does it, it is as a matter of courtesy, and not as a matter of international right. The state of slavery is deemed to be a MERE MUNICIPIAL REGULATION, founded upon and limited to the range of the territorial laws. This was fully recognised in Somersett's case, Lofft's Rep. 1; which was decided before the American revolution.

Having read to you so many decisions of both the supreme courts of different states, and of the supreme court of the United States, some of them rendered soon after the adoption of the Constitution, and various acts of Congress, all consistent with one another, and all of them uniformly in favor of liberty, let me ask any Democrat here, "What do you candidly think about this record? Were the fathers all wrong? Were none of them capable of putting a proper construction upon the Constitution of the United States—they who themselves had made it? And since our fathers have so thought and acted for seventy-eight years, had we not better let their construction of the Constitution stand, than to turn and twist it into favoring slavery? Let me read you what Judge STORY says in this same case, page 621:

Under such circumstances, if the question were one of doubtful construction, such long acquiescense in it, such cotemporaneous expositions it it, *and such extensive and uniform recognition of its validity*, would in our judgment entitle the question to be considered at rest; unless indeed the interpretation of the Constitution is to be delivered over to interminable doubt throughout the whole progress of legislation and of national operation. Congress, the Executive, and the Judiciary, have, upon various occasions acted upon this, as a sound and reasonable doctrine.

I am now done reading authorities. I know, that in speaking before a popular audience, it is very annoying and disagreeable for a speaker to be compelled to interrupt the flow of his discourse by dull and prosy readings; and more especially so, when his readings are drawn from dry stat-

utes and legal decisions; and I fear that I have already presumed too much upon your indulgence and wearied you. I have endeavored, in each instance, to read just as little as I could, and convey the meaning I desired. I apprehend that what I have read to you has a direct bearing upon the issues of this political campaign. And now that it is done, I am glad of it; for, perhaps no one else could have been found, willing, at the risk of being thought dull and prosy, to have gone searching around among the law books, and dished up to you what I have been dishing up. I have shown to you by the Nebraska Bill, Dred Scott decision, and Democratic platforms, that both wings of the Democratic party are pledged to a system of slavery extension, which has already judicially covered the vast territorial domain of this Republic with the black pall of slavery, and when carried out to its logical conclusions, to that extent to which the Democratic party, are pledged to carry it, will spread the terrible curse of human bondage, over every foot of soil, both State and territorial, over which the flag of our common country waves; for I defy any man upon the plain principles of constitutional construction, upon the principles of common sense, of reason, and of logic, to begin by admitting the justice and binding force of the Dred Scott decision—that slavery is recognized by the Constitution, and that the Constitution acts upon that unfortunate class of God's children *as property merely*, and not as *persons*, and then demonstrate the authority of any State in this Union to set aside and abrogate that Constitution, and demonstrate by what authority the States of New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, have purged themselves of that relic of barbarism. It cannot be done. It is only by adopting the old time honored construction that our fathers gave it, that the Constitution acts upon the negro race *as persons*, leaving the question of slavery to be determined by the State laws—holding that nothing can be permitted to support slavery but *positive State law*—that any State has a right to abolish it. I have shown you, too, I trust, that the supreme court, and both wings of the Democratic party, in adopting the new dogma that the Constitution, *per se*, carries slavery into the territories, they have been compelled *wholly to cut loose from the policy of the fathers.*

I now put the question fairly to any Democrat here, which do love best, freedom or slavery? Which do you prefer should be the ruling idea of our nation? Which construction do you wish should be placed upon the Constitution of our country, that which our fathers have given it for seventy eight years in favor of freedom, or that which the slave oligarchy of the south, when they had obtained a ruling majority of your party, gave it, in favor of slavery? Which? If you love liberty, if your hearts are throbbing with a genuine love of freedom, come, join the Republican ranks, and help us to swell liberty's acclaim—come, you shall be welcome here, and you shall be fortified in your position by the history of this Republic, in an unbroken line, from 1776 up to 1854. (Applause.)

Sometimes Democrats say to me: "I am just as much opposed to the Dred Scott Decision as you are—but the Court has made the decision, and I must now abide by it." Why did not Judge Taney *abide by* the decisions of JOHN MARSHALL and JOSEPH STORY? If he could overrule their decisions, sustained as they are by every decision ever made by any court of a civilized people;—by all the history of this Republic up to 1854—founded in the immutable principles of truth, and "leaning in favor of life and liberty," how happens it that whatever Taney may say, must stand as "eternal as the rock-ribbed hills," even when Taney's decision has not a single precedent in all the jurisprudence of the world, and is falsified by every fact of history? Do you not see where a blind adhesion to anything the court may say will lead you? Suppose Taney should decide that all laboring white men should be sold into slavery. Would you "abide" by that decision too? Such a decission would have just as much foundation *in truth* as the Dred Scott decision has. Decisions were at one time rendered by the infamous court of Star Chamber, in England, and the blood of the innocent Lord Stafford was shed under a judicial decision. "The King can do no wrong" is a maxim of tyranny, but what is the difference between it and "the court can do no wrong?" You point me to one decision, and say, "here, abide by this." I point you to an unbroken line of decisions, all one way, during the whole history of our Republic, rendered by MARSHALL and STORY, and say, "this is the law, I will abide by these."

It may be unnecessary before this audience for me to say, that in this contest I am unalterably attached to the principles of liberty and unalterably opposed to slavery; and ranging myself, not only with the fathers of this Republic, but with the

great and good of all time, I am ready to cry out against human bondage in any and in every form. *I hate slavery*, and I can adopt the language of George Washington, the father of his country, and say, "that there is not a man living who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a plan adopted for the abolition of it;" and with John Randolph, who said in Congress, in the earlier and better days of this republic, "Sir, I envy neither the heart nor the head of that man from the north, who rises here to defend slavery from principle," and I believe with James Monroe, and can adopt his language and say, "we have found that this evil has preyed upon the very vitals of this Union, and been prejudicial to all of the States in which it has existed;" and with George W. Summers, of Virginia, "that the evils of slavery cannot be enumerated;" and with Judge Gaston, of North Carolina, "that slavery impairs our strength as a community, and poisons our morals at the fountain head;" and with Luther Martin, an other Virginian of the olden time, that "slavery is inconsistent with the genius of Republicanism—it lessens the sense of the equal rights of mankind, and habituates us to tyranny and oppression;" and with Lord Mansfield, that "slavery is so odious that nothing can support it but positive law;" and with the philosopher Plato, "slavery is a system of the most complete injustice;" and with Socrates, that "slavery is a system of outrage and robbery;"and with LordBrougham, "while men despise fraud, and loathe rapine and blood, they will reject, with indignation, the wild and guilty phantasy that man can hold property in man;" and with Burke, the great English Statesman, that "slavery is a state so improper, so degrading, so ruinous to the feelings and capacities of human nature, that it ought not to be suffered to exist;" and with Dr. Johnson, that "no man is by nature the property of another;" and with Baron Von Humboldt, "that slavery is a system which is not only opposed to all of the principles of morality, but, as it appears to me is pregnant with appalling and inevitable danger to the Republic;" and I believe with that eminent writer Locke, "every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has a right to but himself;" and with John Jay, that eminent Judge, of the purest patriotism and deepest erudition, one of the fathers of our Republic, "slavery ought not to be introduced or permitted in any of the new States;" and with John Quincy Adams, the "old man eloquent," whose language uttered long ago has a special significance when we remember that slavery is now defended by the Southern wing of the Democracy on bible ground, he said "it perverts human reason, and induces men endowed with logical powers to maintain that slavery is sanctioned by the christian religion;" and with Alexander Hamilton, "natural liberty is the gift of the beneficent Creator of the whole human race;" and with Benj. Franklin, "slavery is an atrocious abasement of human nature;" and with Owen Lovejoy in his late speech, "if you fuse together polygamy, and everything that is bad, the resultant amalgam is slavery;" and with Beattie, "that slavery is detrimental to virtue and industry;" I believe, too, with Daniel Webster, and in his language say, "I never would consent, and never have consented, that there should be one foot of slave territory beyond what the old thirteen States had at the formation of the Union, never, never;" (applause,) and I believe, too, with Henry Clay, and mark it, you old line Whigs, you who have followed the leadership of the gallant Harry of the west; you, who in 1844, with Clay and Frelinghusysen for your standard bearers, here in Illinois, made a most glorious fight against the Democracy then lead by Stephen A. Douglas, and suffered defeat with Clay; who heard the vituperation and slanders then heaped upon the head of your chosen and beloved leader, by this same man Douglas, who is now perambulating New England, shedding crocodile tears over the grave of the sage of Ashland, and singing disgusting and fulsome peans to his memory; Clay, who never wrote a letter declaring he would accept the nomination of his party only upon certain conditions, and then when the Convention had met, telegraphing that he would accept the nomination even with the odious Wickliffe Resolution that his own party organs dare not publish; who never was disgraced by his party, by being displaced from the chairmanship of a committee that he had held for years, and who, if he had been, would never have went cringing back into the caucuses of a party that had thus disgraced him—your Clay never did any of these mean things, but in the proud consciousness of his manhood declared he would "rather be right than be President." (Applause.) Could you have seen Henry Clay in his old age, full of honors as he was, coming out of his retirement

at Ashland and making a pilgrimage to Washington in 1850, to cast the oil of temperate debate upon the turbulent agitation there—the great Pacificator;—could you have watched his course through all that struggle—his action on the celebrated committee of thirteen;—could you have been there, in Washington, and saw him as he rose in Congress, lifting his tall form to its full height—could you have heard the thrilling, tremulous earnestness of that old man's silvery voice, as he uttered those truthful burning words, which, with Benton, I can say, " I could have wished that I had spoken those same words. I speak them now, telling you they were his, and adopting them as my own,"—he said " so long as God allows the vital current to flow through my veins, I will never, never, never, by word or thought, by mind or will, aid in submitting one rood of free territory to the curse of human bondage; " (applause,) here will I found my faith, and if these great and good men were right, then am I right; here will I build my house, without fear that when the wind and the rains shall beat upon that house it will fall, for it will be founded upon the " Rock of Ages "—firmly rooted in the principles of immutable and eternal truth.

My respects are due to the ladies here, who have enlivened this occasion with their presence, and who have so heroically remained, listening to my dry readings from these musty law books. I always had a sort of "liking " for the ladies, and I cannot shake it off even in political matters; and I should like on this occasion to say something entertaining to you, but I dare not undertake it, I am always so awkward and bungling whenever I undertake to be complimentary and gallant. I will, however, venture to remark that the ladies have made this meeting a much pleasanter one than it would have been without their presence; and venture a hope that during this canvass our meetings may many times be enlivened and cheered by the light of their beautiful eyes, and many a blushing young orator made happy by the clapping of their delicate hands, and why not—why should woman not be interested in the questions we discuss? They are deep and broad questions, as deep and broad as man's destiny is—and when we speak of man's destiny, do we not always speak of it in that broad, biblical sense, that " embraces" woman? Where is the woman that would be willing to admit that her sex is excluded from that glorious old declaration that " all men are created equal" &c., and that because she is a woman, she should be excluded from those " self evident " privileges of " life, liberty," and especially the " pursuit of happiness."—(Laughter.) A few days ago I was talking to a Democrat about this Dred Scott decission, and putting on considerable dignity, he came at me with this poser: " Why, you might as well claim that woman are citizens, as to claim that negroes may be." I confess that I was somewhat surprised to find even the " progressive democratic party " getting along quite so fast, and I suppose that the next decision that we shall get from the Supreme Court will be that " woman have no rights which white men are bound to respect." (Laughter.) Ladies, I have pleasure this evening in assuring you that the Constitution of our country regards you as " persons," and that you are citizens, known to our laws, and have rights which everybody are " bound to respect." The courts of our country are yet open to you, to bring suits, if you will, for instance, for breach of promise, (laughter,) but I hope none of you will be suing me for that, (renewed laughter,) however, if any of you want to sue any body else, I will gladly be at your service, as attorney, (laughter) and if I should not be successful, and the " gay deceiver " should happen to reside in another State, I will take your case up to the Supreme Court, and see what sort of a decision old Taney would make. (Laughter and applause.)

My brother Wide Awakes, a word to you. To older men I can only address myself in the inexorable logic of the facts of history, but to you, young men, of whom I am, and with whom I am in sympathy, may I not offer some words of encouragement. The battle that we are waging turns upon no party measures; we are battling upon PRINCIPLE—upon the fundemental principles of free government itself. And upon the *young men* of this nation, the burden of the struggle must fall; as it did in the revolutionary times. Jefferson was a young man when he drafted the Declaration of American Independence—Washington was a young man when he was first Commander-in-Chief of the Continental army.—Young men, let us be earnest and faithful, our lamps " trimed and burning " for "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." When we have placed " Honest Old Abe" in the Presidential chair, as we will, our task will not be done; for which time shall last there must be advocates for TRUTH,

there must be laborers for the eternal principles of RIGHT and JUSTICE. When the years shall have rolled away—when the last Wide Awake of our band, after a ripe old age, and full of honors, as I trust, stark and cold in death, is borne upon his bier to "God's Acre;" after the clods of the valley have rattled upon his coffin; after the defacing hand of Time has removed every memorial of his last resting place, and the white daisies are blossoming, and the green sward growing smooth above his grave, the fundamental principles for which we are contending in this canvass, will be just as truthful, and just as vital as now. Let us "hang our banners on the outward walls" —"gird on our armor," and "press forward the column"—"enlisted for life!"— In such a contest, a contest upon PRINCIPLE, it matters very little who our leaders are; and yet, young men, we have been highly complimented in the choosing of ABRAHAM LINCOLN and HANNIBAL HAMLIN as our standard bearers—free labor and individual effort have been honored. It was one of the features of the law, in the ancient Republic of Athens, that all children born were the children of the Republic, and at a very young and tender age they were taken out of the care of their natural parents, and placed under the control of the government at large. Their education and training was wholly attended to by the government, and at its expense. Thus it happened that there was no aristocracy in Athens. All children born set out in the race of life upon an equal footing. Lycurgus, the old Athenian law giver, never caught from the inspirations of the Delphic Oracle a more beautiful thought. If, in this Republican form of government of ours there be one feature that shines with a brighter lustre than another, it is that feature of equality which allows the humblest boy of all our land to attain to the highest and most honored position. Lincoln and Hamlin both started poor; their biographers will write of either of them, as is written of the most honored names in history, "he was born of humble, but honest parents." Lincoln was a farmers son, a backwoodsman, a rail-mauler, a flat-boatman, a school teacher, a surveyor, and a lawyer. In Lincoln and Hamlin two more bright stars are added to the glorious galaxy of self-made men. George Washington was a surveyor; Daniel Webster a farmers son, and a coppying clerk in a county clerks office; Henry Clay—gallant Henry of the West, will always be best known as the "Mill boy of the Slashes;" when the "Wagon Boy" is named, the venerable and Honorable Thomas Corwin, of Ohio, is always recognized; Ben Franklin was a tallow chandlers son, and a "typo;" Patrick Henry and Andrew Jackson fought their own way upward—so has Lincoln. On the scroll of fame his name will blaze for-ever bright by the side of theirs. Boys, let us sustain Abraham Lincoln, "lock-step, shoulder to shoulder, and breast to back." [Applause.] Already we hear coming up from the South an acknowledgment of his success, mingled with mutterings and threats of disunion. Let us not be frightened by it. Let us teach these men, that we have determined, in dead-earnest, to wrest this government from the hands of corrupt conspirators, and place an "honest man" in the presidential chair, who will administer this government on the principles of our fathers. Let the word go back to them, shouted by the stentorian voices of millions of freemen, for it is time that they should know it, that when, in a constitutional and proper way, we have elected Abraham Lincoln, *he shall be* inaugurated. I do not believe that there will be any trouble—I do most sincerely hope that there may not be. I do not believe that there are many people in the south willing to accept of the leadership of a Keitt, and in the event of the election of Lincoln make an effort to "rend this Union from turret to foundation Stone." I do not believe that many would be found there willing to accept of the advice of Governor Wise, and in the event of the election of a Republican president, "march up to the capital, take possession of the archives of government, and prevent his inauguration." I do not believe that the South have already "sent agents to Europe to make an argument for a Southern Confederacy." I do not believe that William L. Yancey has already "organized a secret order in the South, that in the event of the election of Lincoln are sworn to dissolve this Union." I do believe that all these are only put forward as electioneering schemes to frighten us out of our votes. But I tell you, Wide Awakes, if they undertake to play a game of that kind, if they will not listen to the teachings of the fathers, nor the voice of reason, we must change our lamps for Sharpe's rifles, and to what we have already said, we must add the eloquent language of gunpowder, and the inexorable convincing argument of lead. [Applause.]

APPENDIX.

Then what is necessary for the nationalization of slavery? It is simply the next Dred Scott decision. It is merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no *State* under the Constitution can exclude it, just as they have already decided that under the Constitution neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature can do it. When that is decided and acquiesced in, the whole thing is done. This being true, and this being the way, as I think, that slavery is to be made national, let us consider what Judge Douglas is doing every day to that end. In the first place, let us see what influence he is exerting on public sentiment. In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently he who moulds public sentiment, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions.—He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. This must be borne in mind, as also the additional fact that Judge Douglas is a man of vast influence, so great that it is enough for many men to profess to believe anything, when they once find out that Judge Douglas professes to believe it. Consider also the attitude he occupies at the head of a large party—a party which he claims has a majority of all the voters in the country.—This man sticks to a decision which forbids the people of a Territory from excluding slavery, and he does so not because he says it is right in itself—he does not give any opinion on that—but because it has been *decided by the court*, and being decided by the court, he is, and you are bound to take it in your political action as *law*—not that he judges at all of its merits, but because a decision of the court is to him a "*Thus saith the Lord.*" He places it on that ground alone, and you will bear in mind that, thus committing himself unreservedly to this decision, *commits him to the next one* just as firmly as to this. He did not commit himself on account of the merit or demerit of the decision, but it is a *Thus saith the Lord.* The next decision, as much as this, will be a *Thus saith the Lord.*—There is nothing that can divert or turn him away from this decision. It is nothing that I point out to him that his great prototype, Gen. Jackson, did not believe in the binding force of decisions. It is nothing to him that Jefferson did not so believe. I have said that I have often heard him approve of Jackson's course in disregarding the decision of the Supreme Court pronouncing a National Bank constitutional.—He says, I did not hear him say so. He denies the accuracy of my recollection. I say he ought to know better than I, but I will make no question about this thing, though it still seems to me that I heard him say it twenty times. I will tell him though, that he now claims to stand on the Cincinnati platform, which affirms that Congress *cannot* charter a bank. And I remind him of another piece of history on the question of respect for judicial decisions, and it is a piece of Illinois history, belonging to a time when the large party to which Judge Douglas belonged, were displeased with a decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, because they had decided that a Governor could not remove a Secretary of State. You will find the whole story in Ford's History of Illinois, and I know that Judge Douglas will not deny that he was then in favor of overslaughing that decision by the mode of adding five new Judges, so as to vote down the four old ones. Not only so, but it ended in *the Judge's sitting down on that very bench as one of the five new Judges to break down the four old ones.* It was in this way precisely that he got his title of Judge. Now, when the Judge tells me that men appointed conditionally to sit as members of a court, will have to be catechised beforehand upon some subject, I say, "You know, Judge; you have tried it." When he says a court of this kind will loose the confidence of all men, will be prostituted and disgraced by such a proceeding, I say, "You know best, Judge, you have been through the mill." But I cannot shake Judge Douglas' teeth loose from the Dred Scott decision. Like some obstinate animal (I mean no disrespect,) that will hang on when he has once got his teeth fixed; you may cut off a leg, or you may tear away an arm, still he will not relax his hold. And so I may point out to the Judge, and say that he is bespattered all over, from the beginning of his political life to the present time, with attacks upon judicial decisions—I may cut off limb after limb of his public record, and strive to wrench him from a single dictum of the court—yet I cannot divert him from it.—He hangs, to the last, to the Dred Scott decision. These things show there is a purpose *strong as death and eternity* for which he adheres to this decision, and for which

he will adhere to *all other decisions* of the same court.—*Abraham Lincoln's Speech, in reply to Judge Douglas at Ottawa, Aug.* 21, 1860.

If the opinion of the Supreme Court covers the whole ground of this act it ought not to control the Co-ordinate authority of this government. The Congress, the Executive and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution, swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives of the Senate and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval, as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision. THE AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT MUST NOT THEREFORE BE PERMITTED TO CONTROL THE CONGRESS OR THE EXECUTIVE.—*Andrew Jackson.*

YOU SEEM TO CONSIDER THE JUDGES AS THE ULTIMATE ARBITERS OF ALL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS, A VERY DANGEROUS DOCTRINE INDEED, AND ONE WHICH WOULD PLACE US UNDER THE DESPOTISM OF AN OLIGARCHY. OUR JUDGES ARE AS HONEST AS OTHER MEN, AND NOT MORE SO, THEY HAVE WITH OTHERS THE SAME PASSIONS FOR PARTY, FOR POWER AND THE PRIVILEGE OF THEIR CORPS. THE JUDICIARY OF THE UNITED STATES IS THE SUBTILE CORPS OF SAPPERS AND MINERS, CONSTANTLY WORKING UNDER GROUND TO UNDERMINE THE FOUNDATION OF OUR CONFEDERATED FABRIC.—*Thomas Jefferson.*

History is philosophy teaching by example. From what judges have attempted and have done in times past, and in England, we may draw some pretty shrewd conclusions as to what, if unchecked, they may attempt, and may do, in times present, and in America. Nor let any man say that the following pages present a collection of judicial portraits distorted and caricatured to serve an occasion. They have been borrowed, word for word, from the *Lives* of the Chief Jusices and the Chancellors of England, by Lord Campell, himself a lawyer and a judge, and though a liberal-minded and free spoken man, by no means without quite a sufficient share of the *esprit du corps* of the profession. Derived from such a source, not only may the facts stated in the following be relied upon, but the expressions of opinion upon points of law are entitled to all the weight of high professional authority.

Nor let it be said that these biographies relate to ancient times, and can have no parallelism, or but little, to the present state of affairs among us here in America. The times which they include are the times of the *the struggle in Great Britain between the ideas of free government and attempts at the establishment of despotism;* and that is *precisely the one now going on among us here in America*, with this sole difference, that over the water, among our Britfsh forefathers, it was the despotism of a monarch that was sought to be established; here in America, the despotism of some two hundred petty tyrants, more or less, in the shape of so many slaveholders, who, not content with lording it over their several plantations, are now attempting, by combination among themselves, and by the aid of northern tools and mercenaries, such as despots always find, to lord it over the Union, and to establish the policy of slaveholding as that of the nation. In Great Britain, the struggle between despotism and free institutions closed with the revolution of 1688, with which these biographies terminate. Since that time the politics of that country have consisted of hardly more than of jostlings between the Ins and the Outs, with no very material variance between them in their social ideas. Among us the great struggle between slaveholding despotism and republican equality has but lately come to a head, and yet remains undetermined. It exhibits, especially in the conduct of the courts and the lawyers, many parallels to the similar struggle formerly carried on in Great Britain. That struggle terminated at last with the deposition and banishment of the Stuart family, and the reestablishment in full vigor of *the ancient liberties of England*, as embodied in the *Bill of Rights.* And so may ours terminate, in the reduction of those who, not content to be brethren seek to be masters, to the republican level of equal and common citizenship, and in the reestablishment of emancipation, freedom, and the Rights of Man proclaimed in our Declaration of Independence, as the national and eternal policy of these United States!—*Introduction to Lives of Atrocious Judges.*

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